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RUMINATIONS ON TEACHING THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
JOHN KIDWELL* 
[Class begins with a few seconds of the music of Henry Purcell,1 played on 
a boom box.  Teacher calls for a volunteer to participate in a brief class 
demonstration; a student is needed to improvise the part of a landowner in 
seventeenth century England.  Student Good Sport comes forward.] 
Teacher: “So, My Lord Good Sport, it’s agreed.  You will sell Blackacre to 
me on the terms set forth in this document?  Would you mind reading the 
document for the benefit of the assembled witnesses?” 
Student Good Sport then reads a document, which Teacher has produced.  
The document is headed “CONTRACT” in suitably ornate gothic script and 
provides as follows: 
CONTRACT 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that Lord Good Sport, Baron of the 
Barony of North Umbria, agrees to bargain, sell, transfer and convey all of the 
land north of the River Ulm of which he is seized (to wit, Blackacre) to Baron 
Teacher in consideration of 500 goats, 6 sheep, 18 puncheons of Port Wine, 
and one river barge, to wit the Bay Breeze,2 the transfer of property by each to 
the other to take place on the eighteenth day of June in the Year of Our Lord 
One Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Six, Anno Domini. 
  In witness whereof we set our hands and seals this day: 
__________________   __________________ 
Teacher  Good Sport 
  Place Wax Seals Here 
Teacher then says, “To make it official, let’s sign.” (Both sign.)  Then Teacher 
gets out a wax candle and matches, and while dripping wax on the paper, says 
to Good Sport, “All right, now impress the melted wax with your signet ring.”  
 
* Haight Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. 
 1. English Baroque composer (1659-95). 
 2. Students, by this time, will have read Neri v. Retail Marine, 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 
1972), a widely studied case interpreting U.C.C. § 2-708(2).  The notes in the textbook reveal that 
the boat in that notorious case was a Bay Breeze model.  Speaking for myself, I think that 
students enjoy these little inside jokes; I confess that I do. 
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At this point Good Sport inevitably looks concerned and Teacher interrupts, 
“What! You’ve forgotten your signet ring again?  What are we to do?  We 
need to finish this up today.  I’m off to France on the morrow.  What a mess.  
Well, let’s just write here next to the wax seal that we are short one signet ring, 
but would have impressed the wax with the ring if we’d had one, initial next to 
it, and hope for the best.”  (Teacher then excuses Student Good Sport who 
returns to a seat in the classroom.) 
The above is, essentially, the way I begin the first day’s class discussion of 
the Statute of Frauds; not, in fact, by addressing the Statute of Frauds at all, but 
rather with a discussion of the seal, and its decline.  The music and the 
dramatization are hardly necessary, but are fun.  I enjoy and am stimulated by 
the unexpected; I assume students react likewise and so try to inject an element 
of the unexpected in my classes.  There is always a risk that I’ll make a fool of 
myself, but I think that students enjoy the fact that I’m willing to take that risk.  
The students have read some material in the casebook about the Statute of 
Frauds (more about that later) but almost nothing about the significance of the 
seal; so they are, in some sense, unprepared for the first part of the lesson. 
I should also add that I believe few topics in the first year of law school 
provide more opportunities for introducing ideas of enduring importance than 
the Statute of Frauds.  Its study allows discussion of history, statutory 
interpretation, the role of law in shaping (or not shaping) behavior, the struggle 
between justice and order, and the extent to which our ideas about what ought 
to be collide with our conceptions of what is.  At one level the Statute of 
Frauds is quite simple, and we all enjoy that.  It is fun for first-year law 
students to confront some material which is relatively direct and accessible and 
which they can readily master at the technical level.  I remember that when I 
was a first year law student the Statute of Frauds material was the only 
material in the textbook that was covered primarily in the form of an extended 
textual note.  I think that was because the casebook author thought that such an 
approach was both economical and effective.  There is, perhaps, less need for 
class discussion in order to develop the basics of the Statute of Frauds material 
than, for example, the material on remedies, interpretation, mistake or the 
policing doctrines.  Like my own teacher, I rely on an extended text note to 
introduce the basic features of the rule(s) we call the Statute of Frauds.  But the 
Statute of Frauds is simple only on the surface; there is more than enough 
complexity to earn it a prominent place in the course.  This essay, I hasten to 
add, has no single thesis; this presents some organizational difficulties.  In the 
face of this problem, I have concluded to begin with a recapitulation of my 
method for introducing the Statute of Frauds in the classroom, along with my 
reasons for utilizing this method, and then to move on to offer a series of 
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comments about the teaching points, which I think the Statute of Frauds 
invites.3 
Let’s return to the dramatization.  Once Good Sport has returned to his or 
her seat I ask students to explain to me the possible justifications for a rule 
which required that, to be enforceable, a contract be in writing and bear a seal 
of melted wax impressed with the mark of the contract-maker.  Without too 
much prompting, this leads someone to suggest that the seal is a formality, 
which is justified in terms of the three functions of form identified by Professor 
Lon Fuller in his classic article.4  These functions are, of course, the cautionary 
function, the evidentiary function and the channeling function.  Students have 
been introduced to these ideas in the textbook some pages in advance of the 
reading assignment for the Statute of Frauds, but have not yet used the ideas in 
class discussion.  Fuller’s taxonomy of functions of form has value far beyond 
the contracts course and demands, in my view, reinforcement by extended 
discussion.  Although many will already be familiar with this taxonomy, a 
recapitulation would not be out of order here.5 
Cautionary function: If people must go through a formal ceremony to 
create legal relationships, the ceremony may warn them that they are doing 
something serious and important.  Such a warning should serve to prompt 
thought about the commitment being made.  Obviously, legal formalities can 
provide greater or lesser degrees of caution.  The requirement of a wax seal 
seems to have a substantial cautionary impact—enhancing the cautionary 
requirement of a writing alone.  Requiring parties to put contracts in writing, 
and then appear before a government official who cross-examines them about 
their understanding of what they have done, provides even more caution; some 
legal systems which utilize public notaries require just this kind of procedure 
to make certain transactions legally enforceable.6 
Evidentiary function: Some forms give us evidence that a transaction took 
place while others also tell us what the terms of the transaction are.  The 
existence of a signed and sealed document provides nearly irrefutable evidence 
that the parties intended to engage in the exchange of promises.  We must say 
 
 3. I should also note that I have not attempted to turn this description of teaching ideas into 
a scholarly treatment of the Statute of Frauds itself.  The result is that my citations are no more 
formal than my notes for class might be. 
 4. Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). 
 5. Since I teach from a book, CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (1995), which I co-authored 
with Professors Macaulay, Whitford and Galanter, I have taken the liberty of editing and 
paraphrasing the summary of Fuller’s ideas from the first volume of our text at pages 292-93.  I 
have also relied on recasting some of the material from our book later in this essay when 
describing the Wisconsin cases and statute, which deal with the part performance doctrine. 
 6. See generally Mortgages: Absence of Notary Seal is Fatal, REAL EST. L. REP., May 29, 
2000, at 4; see also Milagros Cisneros, Notorious Notaries-How Arizona is Curbing Notario 
Fraud in the Immigrant Community, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 287 (2000). 
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“nearly irrefutable” because there is a chance that the document contained a 
forged signature or seal, or that the signatories were coerced or misled in some 
way into executing the document.  The more important the transaction, the 
more likely it is that there will be a temptation to adopt a form, in order to 
enhance the quality of the evidence. 
Channeling function: A legal form is important to people who want to do 
something with legal consequences.  If you want to be sure that you have a 
legally enforceable contract, it is useful to find a blueprint telling you how to 
build one.  The requirement of a seal provides a useful way to distinguish 
between talking about making a deal and actually making one.  It should be 
noted, however, that forms can sometimes stand as obstacles to people’s 
abilities to accomplish their objectives.  A formal requirement works to 
effectively channel the behavior only of those who know about it.  To the 
extent that formal requirements are good forms—that is, that they are separate 
from the substantive elements—they require that you know about them.  In 
other words, you need to have the instruction manual in order to be able to 
accomplish the task.  There are other ways to channel behavior.  You can make 
the steps intuitive, and natural, for example.  We know that often-effective 
system designers seek to make the system intuitive (and non-formal) rather 
than formal (and to the uninformed, impossible).  In other words, good 
software can be used even by people who haven’t read the manual. 
In fact, I would urge that one of the greatest pitfalls of the use of forms for 
channeling behavior is to mistakenly believe that since forms can channel 
behavior they will.  Even those who know the forms may not follow them.  
You can build sidewalks in order to get people to walk where you would like 
them to, but if you are really interested in saving the grass you are wiser to 
wait to see where people are going to walk, and then build the sidewalks 
there.7 
Although Fuller does not list it as a separate function of form, one could 
add judicial efficiency to the list of functions of form.  Courts may benefit by 
having readily available signs to help them separate the valid from the invalid.  
Some would argue that the judicial efficiency function is easily included in the 
channeling function.  Courts, after all, need channels too.  The more objective 
the formal requirements, the easier it is for judges.  Contrast two legal rules.  
One rule says that manufacturer may sell an item without responsibility for its 
 
 7. I base this belief on observation, and refer to it as “Kidwell’s delayed sidewalks” 
principle.  While at a venerable East Coast university, I noticed a new building on a part of 
campus served by gravel and dirt sidewalks.  The sidewalks were added some months later than I 
would have expected.  I then noted that, all over campus, the sidewalks seemed more “organic” 
than in the Midwest, and there seemed to be fewer instances of non-conformity between sidewalk 
and actual path.  They built the sidewalks after observing where people naturally wanted to walk.  
It can be argued that Llewellyn, in drafting the U.C.C., was seeking to have rules, which ratified 
good faith business behavior, rather than trying to shape that behavior. 
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defects if the seller obtains a sealed release from the buyer.  The other rule 
allows disclaimers only if a buyer “should reasonably have known” that the 
seller intended an “as is” sale.  In the first case, the question asks little more 
than whether the seller used the appropriate language and secured the seal.  In 
the second, one must weigh and balance norms and facts to determine what the 
buyer should have known.  Moreover, the channel serves more than the judge’s 
convenience.  It is easier for others who want to predict judicial outcomes if 
the law provides an unambiguous outcome and if the parties have embodied 
their respective promises in a sealed document.  This last point concerns the 
legitimacy of the judicial role in a society where legislatures are supposed to 
have primary rulemaking power.  Some think that the more clear judges are in 
the rule-applying rather than rule-making business, the easier it is to defend 
what they do. 
(Drum roll for big teaching point.) If one sought only to achieve the ends 
which forms facilitate, we would still celebrate the seal, for it is a wonderful 
form, which is why I begin my class with the sealed writing rather than the 
somewhat diluted formal requirement of a mere signed writing.  The wax seal 
seems, in many ways, the perfect form.  It is pure ritual.  There is no reason, 
other than to fulfill the advantages of a formal requirement, to drip melted wax 
on a perfectly good document, and then get your ring dirty by pressing it in the 
warm wax.  One may, for planning purposes, or during negotiation, construct 
something which looks very much like a writing sufficient to satisfy the Statute 
of Frauds, but I can’t imagine going that last step and putting a wax seal on it, 
just for practice, or by accident!  Perfect forms, in other words, are never 
practiced except on purpose.  The meaning of the execution of a perfect form is 
entirely unambiguous. 
Back to the classroom dramatization.  After drawing out the advantages of 
the form, and the ways in which wax seals accomplish those advantages, I ask 
the class how it thinks a court would deal with the document executed by Good 
Sport and Teacher.  Remember, we had no seal, and instead simply initialed 
our plea to be forgiven for the absence of the last step in the process, and urged 
that the document be treated as it would have been had Good Sport 
remembered the ring.  If there is time, I invite someone to argue on behalf of 
giving the document full effect without the final step.  If there is no time I 
simply tell them that, in the face of the claim that parties who have forgotten 
their rings in the castle should not be disabled from making contracts, courts 
have almost uniformly yielded, and enforced the almost, but not quite 
complete, form.  If the real objective here is to honor the intentions of the 
parties, then the formal requirement (which is by its nature entirely extraneous 
to the substantive objective) stands as an obstacle to justice, and needs to be 
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put to one side.8  And so I hypothesize the first court forgiving the absence of 
the ring, if the wax was there, and the second forgiving the lack of wax (if 
replaced by a gummed gold sticker which is less likely to fall off and make a 
mess in the filing cabinet), and the third accepting a hand-drawn picture of a 
seal, and the fourth accepting merely the recital of the Latin phrase locus 
sigilli—place of the seal—until we finally arrive at the bottom of the slippery 
slope at L.S., the abbreviation for the Latin phrase, pre-printed on a form 
bought at a stationers (or downloaded from http://www.legalforms4you.com).  
And so we are left with none of the advantages which the form initially 
provided.  There is no cautionary, no evidentiary and no channeling function to 
L.S., and its presence or absence is appropriately ignored. 
The truth is not far from my fiction.  The decay of the significance of the 
seal is well, and engagingly, told by Corbin9 in chapter ten of his treatise and, 
no doubt, by others 10 as well.  The advantages of form were eroded by the 
relentless pressure of calls upon justice.  Finally, we come in class to the 
Statute of Frauds itself. 
I then suggest that (obviously) a requirement that a contract be in writing is 
functionally very like the requirement of a seal.  Such a requirement is 
attractive for the same reasons that the seal requirement is attractive.  If 
everyone knew and followed the forms there would be less conflict, and justice 
would be speedy and certain.  Social order would be enhanced.  But we don’t 
care just about social order.  We care also about individual justice.  And we 
know that not all people know the rules, and even when they do they might 
find reasons not to follow them.  If we enforce the formal requirement in these 
cases, we sacrifice individual justice in favor of social order, which always at 
least makes us pause.  And sometimes we yield to the urge to make an 
exception and soften the formal rule.  I then suggest that it can be argued that 
every formal rule is under relentless pressure from our desire for individual 
justice.  This is not news to those who are teaching law, or to those who have 
completed law school, but it may be a generalization which new law students 
have not yet made.  We always are tempted to make exceptions to rules that 
 
 8. To put the point more eloquently, one might borrow from Lord Atkin’s language in a 
quotable English case (not about the Statute of Frauds): “When these ghosts of the past stand in 
the path of justice clanking their mediaeval chains the proper course for the judge is to pass 
through them undeterred.”  United Australia, Ltd. v. Barclay’s Bank, Ltd., [1941] 1 App. Cas. 29 
(P.C. 1940). 
 9. See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed., 
West Publishing Co. 1993).  I mention Corbin here because I would encourage those who have 
not consulted his work recently to do so.  Although eclipsed in some respects by more modern 
treatises, Corbin is such a wonderful and engaging writer that he is well worth consulting, even if 
not for the most recent thinking on a topic. 
 10. See Frederick Crane, The Magic of the Private Seal, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 24 (1915).  This 
article recounts the history of the decline of the private seal, and calls for its abolition in New 
York, in light of “the absurdities to which these rules and exceptions have now led us.” 
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depend on form because we always care, to some extent, about the injustice, 
which results when we enforce the formal requirement.  Thus, formal 
requirements tend to decay.  Not always, and not perhaps as dramatically as in 
the case of the seal, but often.  Writing requirements, notice requirements, 
filing requirements, statutes of limitations—all invite exceptions. 
Now, before describing what I do next, I must make a confession, and an 
apology.  At least twenty-five years ago, I read an account of the history of the 
Chinese civil service examination in a book.  It made a big impression on me, 
and I have used the story, in one form or another, for years.  I have no notes.  I 
have no citations.  The account may be at least somewhat apocryphal, or an 
author’s transformation of real history into a more compelling story.  But it is 
such an instructive story that I am going to include it even though it doesn’t 
have an appropriate pedigree.  Since this is an essay, rather than an article, I 
beg your indulgence.  I should say in my own defense at this point that what I 
do is arguably no different from what judges do when they summarize the facts 
at the beginning of an appellate opinion.  Their summary of the facts is often 
designed, in fact, to serve primarily as an instructive tale; dissenters or the 
lawyers or parties, often complain that the court’s opinion takes liberties with 
the facts.  The facts, in that sense, function as fable rather than as history; we 
generally don’t care if fables are true, so long as they are instructive. 
So, once upon a time in a country we might call China, it came to pass that 
the leaders created a difficult examination to be used to select people who 
wanted government jobs.  The examination was chosen in order that the wisest 
and best educated of the applicants would be chosen to serve, rather than those 
who had good connections.  The examination was challenging, and if you 
wanted to pass you needed to spend years in the universities studying.  After 
the examination had been in place for some time, one of the applicants wrote 
an essay in a particularly effective eight-part form.  As someone once said, 
imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, and soon most who took the 
examination wrote their essays in this form.  Some of the questions, which 
were asked, worked better than others, and so those questions were used again.  
The answers of those who passed, written, of course, in the eight-part form, 
were imitated.  And so those who studied for the examination spent more and 
more of their time memorizing eight-part answers to the questions which were 
more and more likely to be on the examination.  Some asserted that before the 
examination was abandoned it had become, to a great extent, a calligraphy 
examination.11 
 
 11. The outlines of the story are consistent with the Encyclopedia Britannica’s description of 
the Chinese Civil Service system.  In describing the evolved examinations given through the 19th 
Century (and which had begun in the 7th Century), we learn that: 
Elaborate precautions were taken to prevent cheating, different districts in the country 
were given quotas for recruitment into the service to prevent the dominance of any one 
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The plausibility of this tale—true, or at least partly true—is based on a 
tendency nearly as powerful as the tendency of form to decay into substantive 
inquiry, and that is (to oversimplify it for the purpose of literary symmetry) the 
tendency of substantive standard to erode into form.  We want to make the 
right decision, but we also want to make it quickly, inexpensively and 
predictably.  We want the criteria to be objective so that we can review 
decisions made by people we aren’t sure we can entirely trust with tasks that 
are either too subtle, or rife with the potential for the abuse of authority.  The 
result is that a great many standards that embody our aspirations for justice, 
even when initially stated in the most general language, are implemented 
through the use of presumptions or rules of thumb.  For example, we grant 
certain privileges to those who are residents—that is, who have a state of mind 
consisting of an intention to make a place their permanent home—but rely 
heavily in making this subtle determination on voting registrations, drivers 
licenses, and taxpaying status as surrogates for the more difficult inquiry.  We 
aspire to protect the “best interests of the child” and indicate that this is the 
standard, but discover that decision-makers are applying the standard 
beginning (and perhaps ending) with a presumption that the child is best served 
by placement with the mother.  We urge an equitable division of property on 
divorce and discover that a fifty-fifty division is what results.  The more 
decisions we have to make, the more likely we are to avoid the difficulty of the 
investigations and balancing that appear necessary and to rely instead on a 
more formal and easily ascertainable rule.12 
 
region, and the testing matter was limited to the Nine Classics of Confucianism.  The 
examination became so stylized that the set form for an examination paper came to be the 
famous ‘eight-legged essay’ (pa-ku wen-chang), which had eight main headings, used not 
more than 700 characters, and dealt with topics according to a certain set manner.  It had 
no relation to the candidate’s ability to govern and was often criticized for setting a 
command of style above thought. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA Chinese Civil Service (1998) (CD-ROM). 
 12. See Lawrence Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. L. 
REV. 786 (1967).  This article provides a more thorough exploration of the ways in which 
different types of rules are implemented.  Friedman develops a typology of legal rules and then 
describes the various ways in which these rules evolve and are applied.  He observes: 
  As a general proposition, we may guess that there is a strong tendency within the 
legal system toward the framing of nondiscretionary rules at some level and that it is 
strongest where it is socially important to have mass, routine handling of transactions, 
which are channeled through some agency of the legal system, or where relative certainty 
of legal expectation is important.  A rule can be nondiscretionary in operation so long as it 
is formally nondiscretionary at any one rulemaking level of the legal system (which has 
many, many such levels) or if it is nondiscretionary at the point of application.  
Consequently, the legal system may have many more discretionary rules formally 
speaking than operationally speaking. 
Id. at 794. 
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This counter-tendency is not, I suppose, directly relevant to the discussion 
of the Statute of Frauds, but seems in order nevertheless, as a counterweight to 
the decay-of-form idea.  I think that it is important to offer observations when 
it seems natural to do so, and not to allow the focus on the topic under 
discussion to devolve into obsession.  Although orderly thought is one of the 
most valuable of lawyerly traits, seeing connections and patterns is another.  If 
once in a while I go in an unexpected direction, I think it not only livens the 
class discussion, but also authorizes students to be intellectually more 
venturesome. 
I think of the classroom discussion as one of the ingredients in a mixture 
which, when fired in the mind of a law student, becomes an idea which the 
student owns, and which we hope resembles understanding.13  Another 
important ingredient is the written material.  Although I am a co-author of a 
published contracts casebook, and have used it for several years, I think that 
my ideas about teaching the Statute of Frauds are not idiosyncratic to those 
materials.  It could influence the order of the discussion, or the emphasis, but I 
think not the dominant themes.  But this might be an appropriate place to 
comment on the written material, which we use to facilitate the class 
discussion. 
The Statute of Frauds material in the text is embedded in a discussion of 
the rules which courts use to sort statements in the form of promises which will 
be given legal effect from those that will not.  Students have learned that social 
promises will not be enforced, and that the doctrine of consideration emerged 
as an important “validation device.”  They read next about the emergence of 
post-promise reliance as a justification for enforcing some promises when 
classical consideration theory would not have permitted it.  The Statute of 
Frauds comes next.  The Statute of Frauds is introduced as part of a family of 
validation devices, not entirely separate from consideration and reliance.  
Before the students come to class to discuss the rules for the first time, they 
have read a brief summary of the history of the statute from its famous birth in 
1677.  They have read (but probably not internalized) that the courts have not 
been as deferential to the Statute of Frauds as courts are to most statutes.  They 
 
 13. This is a risky, and perhaps, pretentious metaphor.  It may happen that either the 
discussion, or the written material, or the student’s manipulation of the ingredients may contain 
error.  The result may be not a fine-glazed truth, but a cracked-pot of an idea. It is good to 
remember the following observation: 
  I know that this, like every other case, will become the parent stock from which a 
motley progeny will spring.  In those after years when this case, elevated to high authority 
by the cold finality of the printed page, is quoted with the customary, “It has been said,” 
perchance another court will say, “Mayhaps the potter’s hand trembled at the wheel.”  
Possibly when that moment comes these words may give the court a chance to say, “Yea, 
and a workman standing hard by saw the vase as it cracked.” 
Oliver v. City of Raleigh, 193 S.E. 853, 857 (N.C. 1937) (dissenting opinion). 
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have read about the six most common subjects of Statute of Frauds 
requirement—promises to convey interests in land, promises by executors, 
promises of suretyship, promises not to be performed within a year, promises 
in consideration of marriage and sales of goods over a specified amount—and 
about the ways in which those provisions have been applied and interpreted. 
Because I find that students have some difficulty with the conventions, 
which lawyers use to discuss writing requirements, I take a little time to 
address them.  Many books may explicitly address these questions, but some 
may not.  First, lawyers generally call any requirement that a document be in 
writing a “Statute of Frauds requirement” even if the requirement does not, in 
fact, literally come from the Statute of Frauds.  Second, because I remember 
my own confusion about contracts “within” and “under” the Statute of Frauds, 
I explicitly explain that contracts “not within” the statute are enforceable 
although they are not writing.  Being “within” the statute means the writing 
requirement must be met.  If the requirement is met, lawyers usually speak of 
the statute being “satisfied” or “met.”  A contract is “outside” the statute if it 
need not be in writing. 
Based on the discussion and lecture summarized earlier in this essay, 
students know what a formal requirement is, and what its vulnerabilities are to 
claims of individual justice.  They also have a sense of the instability of at least 
some legal rules; rules always appear vulnerable to improvement by making 
them either more formal and predictable, or more responsive to the variety of 
particular facts that make up any single claim.  Then we move to explore, 
through a series of cases and a statute, one particular developed exception to 
the language of the statute—the “part performance” exception.  This is done 
(primarily) in the course of a review of three Wisconsin cases and a Wisconsin 
statute.  We chose the part performance rule for a number of reasons.  First, it 
is relatively important, and so studying it in some detail deepens students’ 
understanding of the Statute of Frauds in a useful way.  Second, it is an 
example, at least initially, of the way in which the Statute of Frauds was 
treated almost as if it were a statement of common law principles, rather than 
as a statute.  Third, it is a discussion which bridges back, and hopefully 
reinforces, the legal significance of post-promise reliance. 
The part performance doctrine initially developed in cases involving land.  
Land is economically important and, in England where the rule developed, 
land ownership played a key role in the culture as well, often determining 
social rank.  Given the importance of the transaction and the fact that many 
third-parties may have an interest in who owns real estate or who has 
mortgages or other interests, contracts involving land seem perfect candidates 
for a strong formal requirement.  However, at least in some situations, courts 
have recognized the claims of those who have relied on oral promises to 
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convey.  In fact, the Court of Chancery began to fashion the doctrine of part 
performance only nine years after the passage of the Statute of Frauds.14 
The first case we consider is a 1901 Wisconsin case taking a not-then-
atypical narrow view of the part performance rule.  In Rodman v. Rodman,15 a 
son sought specific performance of an alleged oral promise by his father to 
make a will leaving real estate to the son.  The trial court entered a judgment 
for the estate and the son appealed.  The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed 
the trial court’s decision.  The facts revealed that the elder Rodman wanted to 
stop actively farming a 500-acre farm.  In 1873, he persuaded Winfield, his 
twenty-two-year-old son, to return to the farm.  Winfield was to operate the 
farm on shares, and they were to live in the homestead together.  Winfield 
married soon after they made this arrangement.  Winfield managed the farm 
for twenty-two years until his father’s death in 1895.  The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court’s affirmance was based on two grounds.  The first was that the trial court 
had ruled that Winfield had not successfully proved an oral contract to make a 
will and this finding was not against the weight of the evidence.  The 
alternative ground for affirmance was that even if Winfield had proved an oral 
contract to make a will, it would have been invalid under the Statute of Frauds.  
The alleged contract concerned the transfer of an interest in real estate.  
Winfield’s work on the farm for twenty-two years did not serve to take the 
case out of the provisions of the Statute of Frauds.  The father had never given 
Winfield exclusive possession of the premises.  The court determined that mere 
performance of services was not enough.16 
Thirty-one years later, the Wisconsin court decided Estate of Powell,17 a 
case with facts not so different than the facts of Rodman.  In this case Lottie 
and George Wilcox sued for specific performance of an oral contract to 
transfer a farm to them by will or by deed.  This time the trial court ruled in 
favor of the plaintiff, and the decree for Lottie and George was affirmed by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court.  Lottie alleged that her uncle had promised to 
transfer a farm to her if she and her husband would work it on shares until the 
uncle’s death.  The uncle had taken Lottie into his home and reared her as his 
own child.  Lottie “performed services in the home as great as any daughter 
could.”18  Lottie cared for the mentally incapacitated son of her uncle, 
attending to his personal cleanliness.  Some time later, Lottie married George 
Wilcox, who at the time, was renting on shares a large highly improved, well-
stocked farm.  The uncle asked them to return to his farm, and they moved 
back and remained until the uncle’s death nearly twenty years later.  The court, 
 
 14. See Butcher v. Stapely, 1 Vern. 363, 23 Eng. Rep. 524 (1686). 
 15. 88 N.W. 218 (Wis. 1901). 
 16. Id. at 220. 
 17. Wilcox v. Powell’s Est., 240 N.W. 122 (Wis. 1932). 
 18. Id. at 124. 
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in its opinion, described at some length the work which the Wilcoxes had done 
during their time on the Powell farm.  Though there was some conflicting 
testimony as to what had been said about the ultimate transfer of the farm to 
the Wilcoxes, Lottie and George testified that Powell had entered into an 
agreement with them before they moved back to his farm.  They were to repair 
the place as if it were their own.  They went back to the farm solely because of 
the agreement, and they expected Powell to will the farm to her. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin said that a trial court should not decree 
specific performance of a contract unless the plaintiff establishes the promise 
by clear, satisfactory and convincing proof.  However, “[t]he trial judge might 
properly find the evidentiary facts as above stated, and we consider that their 
cumulative force warranted the inference of ultimate fact that a contract to 
transfer the farm was made.”  Then the Supreme Court turned to the Statute of 
Frauds issue: 
  It is urged that there was no such partial performance by the respondents 
[Lottie and George Wilcox] as to warrant specific enforcement of the contract 
because the proof does not show that the respondents entered upon the land as, 
and solely as, a result of the contract . . . . But there is testimony of the 
respondents themselves to the precise point that they did so enter, and the 
circumstances indicate that they would not have gone upon the farm as mere 
tenants and that they did not so enter.  It is urged that possession alone and that 
services alone do not constitute sufficient performance.  While it may be that 
no one act or no one class of acts of the respondents would alone have 
constituted sufficient partial performance to warrant specific enforcement, 
their acts in the aggregate throughout the twenty years that were beyond the 
requirements of ordinary tenancy and husbandry were such that to deny them 
specific enforcement would operate as a fraud upon them, and the prevention 
of fraud is the basis of and reason for, the equitable relief of specific 
performance.19 
  It is to be regretted that the wishes of the testator, which were entirely 
reasonable, and which he endeavored to place in legal and binding form, failed 
to become effective by reason of a failure to properly witness the will, of 
which he knew nothing.  These matters, however, are of little moment in the 
consideration of the issues of this case.20 
The Wilcoxes won, and most who read the opinion, I think, would have 
understood it as softening, at least, the doctrine announced in Rodman.  It is, of 
course, worth observing that in both cases the Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court.  One could read the opinions, in that sense, as consistent. 
In 1969, no doubt in part to try to clarify the possible confusion concerning 
the reach of the part performance rule, Wisconsin enacted a statute drafted by a 
 
 19. Id. at 125. 
 20. Rodman, 88 N.W. at 219. 
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committee of the State Bar Association of Wisconsin.21  The legislation stated 
both the writing requirement and the exceptions to protect reliance on oral 
promises.  Section 706.01(1) of the Wisconsin statute provides that, subject to 
a few exceptions, chapter 706 of the statute “shall govern every transaction by 
which any interest in land is created, aliened, mortgaged, assigned or may be 
otherwise affected in law or equity.”22  The major exceptions are wills and 
leases for less than a year.  Section 706.02(1) provides, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
Transactions under s. 706.01(1) shall not be valid unless evidenced by a 
conveyance which: 
 (a) Identifies the parties; and 
 (b) Identifies the land; and 
 (c) Identifies the interest conveyed, . . . ; and 
 (d) Is signed by or on behalf of each of the grantors; and 
(e) Is signed by or on behalf of all parties, if a lease or contract to 
convey . . . .23 
Section 706.04 states the counterrules.  It provides: 
A transaction which does not satisfy one or more of the requirements of s. 
706.02 may be enforceable in whole or in part under doctrines of equity, 
provided all of the elements of the transaction are clearly and satisfactorily 
proved and, in addition: 
(1) The deficiency of the conveyance may be supplied by reformation in 
equity; or 
(2) The party against whom enforcement is sought would be unjustly 
enriched if enforcement of the transaction were denied; or 
(3) The party against whom enforcement is sought is equitably estopped 
from asserting the deficiency.  A party may be so estopped whenever, 
pursuant to the transaction and in good faith reliance thereon, the 
party claiming estoppel has changed his position to his substantial 
detriment under circumstances such that the detriment so incurred 
may not be effectively recovered otherwise than by enforcement of 
the transaction, and either: 
(a) The grantee has been admitted into substantial possession or use of 
the premises or has been permitted to retain such possession or use 
after termination of a prior right thereto; or 
 
 21. See WIS. STAT. § 706 (1969). 
 22. Id. § 706.01. 
 23. Id. § 706.02. 
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(b) The detriment so incurred was incurred with the prior knowing 
consent or approval of the party sought to be estopped.24 
In addition, section 706.01(6) provides, “[t]his chapter shall be liberally 
construed, in cases of conflict or ambiguity, so as to effectuate the intentions of 
parties who have acted in good faith.”25 
The statute provides a “nice” opportunity to raise questions about the 
clarity of statutory codifications.  Does the statute clarify the reach of the part 
performance rule?  Would it require a different result in the Rodman case?  
Would it permit affirmance of a case on the same facts as Wilcox, if the trial 
court had ruled against the alleged promises?  What problems could one 
foresee arising under the new statute? 
In any event, ten years later in Estate of Lade26 the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin confronted a case governed by section 706.04(3).  The court in its 
opinion discusses both the Rodman and Powell decisions.  The opinion tells us 
that Lade had agreed orally to sell his farm to his neighbor, Ketter, who had 
been working part of the farm on a shares basis for about ten years.  Ketter 
sought to enforce the promise and claimed that the Statute of Frauds should not 
apply because of section 706.04(3).  He sought damages because Lade had 
sold the farm to a third party.  This buyer did not have notice of Ketter’s oral 
contract with Lade, and so specific performance could not be granted.  The 
trial court had granted a damages award on a quantum meruit theory.  On an 
appeal the plaintiff sought to sustain the damage award.  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court ruled that the quantum meruit theory was misguided, and that 
the award could not be sustained on a breach of contract theory because the 
requirements of section 706.04(3) had not been satisfied.27  For reasons that 
will be apparent shortly, it is worth quoting the opinion at length.  The court 
explained: 
  Ketter’s case for equitable estoppel-part performance is based on personal 
services to Lade and on improvements made on Lade’s farm.  Also raised is a 
claim that he refrained from buying over [sic] farmland in reliance on the oral 
agreement.  In examining acts alleged to constitute part performance, only 
those acts performed after creation of the oral contract may be considered, and 
only those acts must be solely and obviously referable to the contract . . . .  
Moreover, the facts alleged to remove the bar of the [S]tatute of [F]rauds must 
be clearly and satisfactorily proved. 
  Under these standards all improvements and services made or performed 
before the contract must be disregarded.  The claim that Ketter would have 
 
 24. Id. § 706.04. 
 25. Id. § 706.01(6). 
 26. 260 N.W.2d 665 (Wis. 1978). 
 27. Id. at 669-70. 
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bought other farmland may also be dismissed because it is not supported by 
clear and satisfactory proof. 
  Ketter contends that Estate of Powell, 206 Wis. 513, 240 N.W. 122 (1932), 
presents a situation closely analogous to this one.  It does not.  The Powell 
court characterized the acts of the successful claimants as going beyond the 
requirements of ordinary tenancy and husbandry.  Ketter’s improvements do 
not meet this test. 
  The evidence of improvements shows that after the contract, although not 
necessarily because of it, Ketter increased the tillable acreage by four acres.  
This indicates no special regard for the property.  Prior to the contract Ketter 
had cleared 17 acres.  He was merely continuing the expansion of his acreage 
and paying rent for the expansion which he had begun as a tenant in 1963. 
  In Powell, supra, the court found that the claimants would have left the 
property if the oral contract had not been tendered.  There is nothing here 
which would suggest that Ketter would not have continued farming and 
expanding his acreage as a tenant without the oral contract. 
  Ketter’s other improvements include repairing a culvert, adding gravel to a 
road, fixing fences to keep cattle out of his corn, and minor building repairs.  
The record does not demonstrate that these improvements were made after the 
oral contract was agreed upon.  Therefore they should be disregarded.  Even if 
they were made after the contract, they are not so beyond the requirements of 
normal husbandry or tenancy as to indicate reliance on the contract.  This is 
also true of Ketter’s fertilization of the land. 
  Much of the alleged part performance consists of services to Lade. 
Personal services to a vendor in reliance upon an oral agreement are not 
enough, standing alone, to constitute part performance.  [citation omitted]  
Because Ketter made no substantial improvements which can be attributed to 
the oral contract, these services are not a basis for part performance. 
  Even if there were valuable improvements to consider along with the 
services, the record does not demonstrate that the services performed after the 
contract was agreed upon were pursuant to the contract.  At one point Ketter 
said that the services were part of the deal.  At another point he stated that the 
services were done as a favor and specifically denied that they were part of the 
agreement.  It is clear that the same services performed prior to any agreement 
were gratuitous. 
  In sum, there is no clear and satisfactory proof of part performance.  Ketter 
has not changed his position to his substantial detriment such that the estate is 
estopped from pleading the [S]tatute of [F]rauds.28 
 
 28. Id. at 668-69. 
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In my discussion of Lade, I emphasize that the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin purported to apply section 706.04, but did so without considering 
the express provisions of the statute in its opinion!  Without elaboration, the 
court assumed that its decisions of 1901 (Rodman) and 1932 (Powell) 
controlled section 706.04(3).  I ask whether section 706.04 was intended to 
merely codify those cases.  In considering the relevance of personal services in 
the part performance doctrine, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that 
“[p]ersonal services to a vendor in reliance upon an oral agreement are not 
enough, standing alone, to constitute part performance” and cites the Rodman 
case.29  I ask whether this is a reasonable reading of either subsection (3)(a) or 
(3)(b) of section 706.04.  Is it even a fair reading of Rodman?  It seems that, in 
Wisconsin at least, we may have come full circle.  The Statute of Frauds was 
enacted in 1677.  Courts began to treat it not as if it were a statute, but almost 
as one treats common law decisions, “amending” it with the part-performance 
doctrine, among others.  This, quite predictably, creates a certain amount of 
confusion and uncertainty.  Nearly three centuries after the enactment of the 
first version of the statute, Wisconsin’s legislature sought to codify, and 
presumably clarify, the rules (and to limit judicial rule-making power?).  
Within ten years the highest court of the jurisdiction has re-created, it seems, 
the confusion, which preceded the legislative effort. 
The relatively extensive discussion of the series of part performance cases 
is, in my view, a good use of class time.  The cases are in no sense important 
cases.  They do, however, give the students a chance to see for themselves the 
interplay, over time, of decisions and statutes within a single jurisdiction.  
They get a glimpse at the problem of distinguishing cases, especially when 
those cases are not particularly well crafted.  Students need to learn early on 
that most opinions are not written by judges who write (or think) as well as 
Hand, Cardozo, Holmes, Traynor, Posner or Kozinski. 
I see by the clock on the wall, and hear by the rustling of notebooks, that 
we are out of time.  Remember that if we had more time we would talk about 
three more things.  First, remember that this writing requirement had its 
origins in the age of the goose-quill pen.  Legislators and others are struggling 
with the sufficiency of electronic documents, digital signatures, and so forth.  
Second, we didn’t have a chance to discuss whether we should repeal the 
Statute of Frauds altogether, or at least reduce its coverage; review the note 
on this in the text.  Finally, remember that the CISG has chosen not to adopt a 
writing requirement.  For tomorrow read pages 360-370. 
 
 
 29. Id. at 669. 
